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The increasingly competitive market environment makes independent innova-
tion the core of the enterprise’s and evens the country’s competitiveness. In
order to solve the problem of its own limited R&D resources, ﬁrms need to ﬁnd
access to outside resources. Since the government mainly provides policy and
ﬁnancial support, the information diﬀusion and learning eﬀects of executive
networks can eﬀectively compensate for the shortage of formal institutional
arrangements. In view of this, we manually collect data on R&D expenditures
and executive networks having common management members in China
A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2010. Combined with corporate
governance and government governance data, this paper empirically tests
the inﬂuence of government governance and executive networks on enterprise
innovation. The empirical results reveal that the governance eﬃciency of the
government where the enterprise is located determines the eﬃciency of
resource allocation ﬁrms are faced with, which provides institutional
constraints on corporate R&D intensity, and that the establishment and scale
of executive networks do contribute to R&D decisions. Further testing shows
that compared with non-state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises are
faced with relatively weaker restraints and pressures in terms of policy, ﬁnance,
technology and competition. Thus, they show no obvious reliance on
government governance quality and the information diﬀusion of executive
networks. The ﬁndings of this study help us to understand the role of informal
systems in social economics, such as relationship networks and social capital,
in the context of China’s economic development, and provide relevant
1 July 1, 2008, the new revision of <Law on
replenished by a new sector ‘‘technological pr
requiring government to guide and support
market, and a technology intermediary servic
2 http://www.sts.org.cn/sjkl/kjtjdt/data2011/
3 World Economic Forum, 2011, The Globa
60 X. Jin et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 9 (2016) 59–81evidence and enrich macro and micro studies of ‘‘government and market” and
‘‘market and enterprise” relationships.
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is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creative-
commons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Enterprise R&D activities enable them to make innovations in products, technologies and procedures,
which determine companies’ competitive advantages and growth in the future (Scherer, 1984; Ettlie, 1998).
The process of innovation not only promotes technological progress, but also becomes the main impetus of
endogenous economic growth. In spite of China’s economy growing miraculously, the sustainability of
economic growth is still worrying; therefore, it is imperative to transfer the mode of economic growth, and
encourage independent innovation by enterprises. As a result, the state has put forward the strategic objective
of building an innovation-oriented country,1 and is treating these micro-economic entities as main players so
as to highlight their importance in the whole innovation system.
According to the ‘‘China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology”, from 1995 to 2009, the average
annual growth rate of national R&D expenditures was up to 20.12%, much higher than GDP growth over the
same period and showing an upward trend. The statistical report of the Ministry of Science and Technology in
20112 also shows that, 71.7% of R&D funds in 2010 are derived from enterprises, and 73.4% of R&D
operating departments are also in enterprises. But the Global Competitiveness Report (2011–2012) reveals
that the ﬁrm-level technology absorption capacity of Chinese mainland enterprises ranks only 61st3 in 142
countries and regions, indicating that the technological innovation of Chinese mainland enterprises is still
not competitive on a global scale. This mismatch of inputs and outputs is subject to the country’s overall level
of technology development, government investment intensity and selection of investment objects. It is also
inﬂuenced by their own resource constraints and strategic decisions.
Meanwhile, enterprises have to confront increasingly intense global competition in the new economic
environment characterized by knowledge and information. On the one hand, in order to maintain continual
motivation to develop and endure competitive strength in an increasingly keen competitive environment,
most enterprises have deeply realized that independent innovation is their impulsion for survival and
development. On the other hand, with the current guidance to build an innovation-oriented country, a series
of preferential policies and security mechanisms to avoid R&D risk have stimulated enterprises’ enthusiasm
to innovation. Under both internal and external stimulus, innovation undoubtedly becomes the driving
force of ﬁrms’ development and progress, while investment in R&D is inevitably an important corporate
expenditure.
‘‘Fiscal Federalism” in China’s transition process and performance-driven ‘‘Oﬃcial Promotion System”,
strongly stimulate local government to progress economic development. The diﬀerences in historical
conditions and natural resource endowments result in diverse institutional constraints on economic
development and in government eﬃciency in diﬀerent areas. Under the pressure of horizontal competition,
local government essentially becomes the regulating subject for the regional economy, playing the role of
quasi-market subject, and directly or indirectly joining in enterprises’ operating activities. Therefore,
governance as a formal arrangement can be either the supporter of the sustainable development of enterprises,
or the taker of corporate value. That is, eﬃciency of governance is often an important factor inﬂuencing thethe Advancement of Science and Technology of PRC> was formally upheld, which was
ogress”, clarifying enterprises as the main subjects in technological innovation, meanwhile
enterprises’ technological innovations by ﬁscal and tax policy, industrial policy, capital
e system.
science and technology statistical data 2011.pdf.
l Competitiveness Report 2011–2012, pp. 491.
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prises to actively apply the limited resources supplied by the formal institutional arrangement, while at the
same time actively seeking informal institutional arrangements (such as networking) for themselves to obtain
actual or potential resources (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998).
Wang (2005) considers that social networks play a prominent role in social operations and resource
allocation in China. For enterprises, social networks include not only the ﬁnancial and family relations among
management members and their common social relations (Hwang and Kim, 2009), but also political relations
between top management and government oﬃcials (Fan et al., 2007). These networks provide more
opportunities for enterprises’ development and growth, which reduces the transaction costs of enterprises
in the development process and information asymmetry, as well as increasing the channels for enterprises
to obtain more resources by expanding social networks and avoiding the irregular behavior of industry and
local government. To sum up, research and development investment decisions are usually the result of formal
institutional arrangements under the background of government intervention and informal institutional
arrangements embedded in enterprise social networks.
We manually collect data on R&D expenditure and the size of commercial networks constituted by
common members of management in listed companies from 2007 to 2010. Combined with ﬁrm ﬁnancial
and governance data and an index of government governance, this paper examines the impact of government
governance on R&D expenditure as a formal institutional arrangement and explores the mechanism of
executive networks as an informal arrangement.
The contributions of this paper are as follows: ﬁrst, it enriches the existing literature on the internal
motivation of enterprise innovation and tests whether informal institutional arrangements and formal
institutional arrangements interact with each other in R&D activities; second, from the micro and macro
perspectives, this paper examines whether informal institutional arrangements (social network), an eﬀective
complementary mechanism for imperfect market systems, help companies acquire technical resources,
promote the upgrade of their core value, and thus encourage macroeconomic growth and improve the
competitive strength of national science and technology; third, it emphasizes that in the transitioning Chinese
market, the absence of paths and mechanisms to obtain resources with formal institutional arrangements
makes ﬁrms utilize social capital embedded in business networks as a sub-optimal choice.
The remainders of this paper are organized as following: theory and research questions are outlined in
Section 2; research design is in Section 3; data analysis and discussion of the empirical results is in Section 4;
conclusions are in Section 5.
2. Theory and research questions
Recent research on R&D investment covers two aspects – inﬂuence factors and economic eﬀects.
Inﬂuencing factors contain market and industry characteristics (Rogers, 2002; An et al., 2006; Zhu, 2006),
equity nature and structure (Hill and Snell, 1988; Baysinger et al., 1991; Wahal and McConnell, 2000), and
corporate ﬁnancial variables (Baysinger et al., 1991; Bhagat and Welch, 1995). Economic eﬀects include
enterprise growth (Mansﬁeld, 1962; Mowery, 1983), productivity and performance (Griliches, 1986; Wu,
2006). However, these studies pay little attention to enterprise R&D activities and their inﬂuencing factors
from the perspective of institutional arrangements. This paper covers the perspectives of governance, executive
networks, and their interaction with each other and enterprise heterogeneity.
2.1. Policy resources for R&D – government governance
Many studies (La Porta et al., 1999; Easterly, 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Easterly and Levine, 2003;
Rodrik et al., 2004; Rose-Ackerman and Kornai, 2004) indicate that governance and its eﬃciency have an
important inﬂuence on economic growth and social development. Easterly (2001) even states that in a variety
of institutional factors aﬀecting economic growth, governance plays a vital role. Government incompetence,
corruption, ineﬃciency and lack of reactive capacity are fatal for economic growth.
A major feature of the Chinese transition economy is that large numbers of resources are still controlled by
the government. The government can intervene in company activities through policies and administrative
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Treisman, 2000). In the process of economic transformation, ‘federalism with Chinese style’ (Qian and
Weingast, 1997; Qian and Roland, 1998; Jin et al., 2005) becomes a strong incentive to economic development
for local governments. Fierce competition between regions is the new reality faced by local governments. They
transform from plan executors under the planning system to political entrepreneurs and do everything possible
to integrate the economic and political resources under their control, make appropriate industrial
development strategy and rely on product and technological innovation to achieve beyond the average
performance of the market. Thus, there is close cooperation between the local government and the entrepre-
neurs in the area. That is, local oﬃcials provide policies and resources, and enterprises provide the required
performance, employment and taxes, and even personal beneﬁts.
Local economic development faces diﬀerent resource constraints due to historical conditions and resource
endowment, which causes the heterogeneity in the eﬃciency of local governments. In order to maintain the
sustainability of local economic development, local governments with rich resources will provide the com-
pany’s technological innovation activities with policy and ﬁnancial support, and enact and implement relevant
policies so as to encourage it to make contributions to local competitive advantages. These eﬃcient
interventions, which are viewed as eﬀective governance, help enterprises to improve their core values and
create favorable conditions for local competitiveness. On the other hand, local governments with poor
resources barely support the innovation activities of companies. But since political achievements are still
needed, local oﬃcials will make the companies perform some social duties by occupying their resources.
Meanwhile, the high risk of innovation activities discourages local governments with low eﬃciency from
supporting the companies. They take resources from the people but do not use them for the people and tend
to breed corruption. As the enterprise development process is not only embedded in their own social network,
but also deeply rooted in the governance background with regional diﬀerences, therefore the eﬃciency of local
governments will undoubtedly have a direct impact on policy formulation, implementation eﬃciency and
resource constraints, which will indirectly aﬀect the R&D decisions of companies.
H1. The higher the eﬃciency of regional governance, the higher R&D expenditures will be.2.2. Enterprise R&D investment strategic resources – executive networks
Social capital based on relationship networks and trust aﬀects the economic development of a country or
region and plays a decisive role in the enterprises’ sustainable development (Guiso et al., 2004). Social
relationship networks owned by enterprises, especially by executives, can improve information access and
delivery speed signiﬁcantly, helping executives make eﬀective decisions, conduct valid monitoring and improve
the eﬀectiveness of corporate governance in order to enhance company value (Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993;
Maman, 1999; Cohen et al., 2010). Executive networks can also improve the speed and eﬃciency of a
company’s access to resources, restrain investment behavior and thereby aﬀect business growth (Uzzi, 1996,
1999; Uzzi and Gillespie, 2002; Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Khanna and Thomas, 2009). At the same time,
network externality makes the decision behavior of network members show the advantages of convergence.
The higher concentration of the company’s position in the social network, the lower the level of heterogeneity
of its investment strategies, and the value of the network enables companies with larger network scale achieve
better operating performance. As an informal institutional arrangement, social relationship networks not only
provide a competitive advantage for the company in inﬂuencing the decision making progress, but also play a
role in limiting existing competitors and the exclusion of other potential competitors (Hochberg et al., 2007),
which is undoubtedly an important strategic resource to help the company maintain its core competitiveness.
Although corporate governance in China is in a transition period from relationship governance to rule-
based governance, traditional culture leaves relationship governance in a dominant position. Executive social
networks can be seen as an eﬀective complement to the internal resources of a company. In particular in the
cultural context of Chinese collectivism, company value is not only assessed by its own competitiveness and
contribution to society, but also decided by the scale of the social network it links to. Studies based on the
Chinese context (Keister, 1998; Ren et al., 2007; Li and Zhang, 2007; Li et al., 2008) found that executive
relationship networks have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on company performance. Peng and Liao (2008) analyzed
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interlocking directorship network, board of directors and the personal behavior of the interlocking directors,
and found that the embedded ability of the interlocking directorships has a signiﬁcant positive impact on a
company’s governance performance. Lu et al. (2006) and Lu and Chen (2009) found the company could
get vital resources through interlocking director enterprises and the organizational function of interlocking
directorships in the listed company is to promote inter-ﬁrm coordination and information transmission.
Chen and Xie (2011) argued that in the interlocking independent directorship network of Chinese listed
companies, independent directors with a higher degree of network-concentration are more motivated and also
better able to monitor managers’ investment decision behavior and therefore curb the ineﬃcient investment
behavior of managers with an opportunistic motivation to gain personal proﬁts. Moreover, they can provide
more accurate and timely information and knowledge on investment opportunities for business decisions
through recommendation functions in order to reduce over-investment and under-investment and improve
investment eﬃciency. With the increasing complexity and risk of innovation and the dramatic changes of
the market environment, companies can hardly complete innovation activities eﬀectively on their own and
external resources have therefore become an eﬀective source of technological innovation. As government
investment in company innovation is policy selective, companies have to look for other ways to seek the core
strategic resources for their technological innovations. Companies are always limited by ﬁnance, human
resources and risks in innovation. A close network connection will assure the timeliness and accuracy of
the companies’ information, and by learning or acquiring key resources from network members, companies
can shape their own core competitiveness. Rogers (1995) found that new innovations are often spread in
the informal interpersonal channels and the structure of the diﬀusion network will aﬀect the speed of adoption
of new innovations. Therefore, constructing the social network can help communication, share resources and
decrease information asymmetry, thus facilitating companies’ R&D activities.
H2. The bigger the executive network, the higher R&D expenditures will be.2.3. Government governance and executive networks: intersection or parallel
When executive networks provide valid information to help executives make decisions, the disparity of the
external environment (government governance) could have a signiﬁcant impact on corporate risk dispersion
and uncertainties decrease. On the one hand, eﬃcient local governments have advantages in policy-making
and system-perfection, so listed companies will get the necessary resources and technologies in R&D activities
easily, and do not need to rely so much on executive social networks. For listed companies from regions with less
governance eﬃciency, theymay not be able to get eﬀective support for R&Dactivities from the local government
through formal institutional arrangements, forcing them to rely more on executive networks, which compen-
sates for the weakness of regional policy support. However, there might be an alternative relationship between
the social network scale and governance eﬃciency in the promotion of R&D investment. Eﬃcient governments
will reduce improper intervention in companies, and provide support for information exchange for network
members from diﬀerent regions, which will further promote R&D activities, while less eﬃcient governments
may intervene too much in order to protect their own interests, worrying that companies will reveal a handful
of actual or potential competitive advantages through their own social networks, especially through regional
networks, and ultimately form institutional barriers for R&D activities. There lies a ‘‘Matthew Eﬀect” in the
executive network and government governance in the promotion of companies’ R&D activities.
However, what companies obtain through executive networks is decision-making information related to
R&D, which may cause the companies to imitate the network members in making R&D investment decisions.
While local governments tend to provide policy and ﬁnancial support, and companies restrained by
governments will adjust their R&D strategies and become a community of interest with the government.
Therefore, executive networks and government governance may have completely diﬀerent eﬀect mechanisms
on the R&D activities of companies and there is no intersection in their pathways.
H3a. There is an interaction eﬀect between the eﬃciency of governance and the eﬀect of executive network
scale on R&D expenditures.
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scale on R&D expenditures.2.4. Firm heterogeneity: nature of property rights
Chinese state-owned enterprises take on more social responsibilities and correspondingly get more help
regarding budget constraints, ﬁnancing facilities and government backing (Li and Xia, 2008). Due to
long-standing monopolies and scale advantages, state-owned enterprises’ technological innovations stem
mostly from internal motivation and self-reliance and their emphasis on external environment and network
relationships is signiﬁcantly weaker than private enterprises. Additionally, agency costs between private
shareholders and management are relatively smaller in private enterprises. Shareholders show stronger control
ability. External dependence and linkages are more close and important, which reﬂects the correlation
eﬀect of government, networks and corporate behavior, while state-owned enterprises show the opposite
relationships.
H4. Compared to non-state-controlled enterprises, government governance (executive networks) has a weaker
eﬀect on the R&D expenditure of state-owned enterprises.3. Research design
3.1. Sample and data
The original sample includes all A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2010.4We exclude the following: (1)
ﬁrms in the Finance and Insurance industry. Characteristics of relevant ﬁnancial data in this industry
signiﬁcantly diﬀer from those of other industries; (2) ﬁrms with an unknown ultimate controller, which refers
to the ultimate shareholder with the largest equity ratio. This information is needed to determine whether the
listed companies are ultimately controlled by the government or not, and therefore we exclude companies with
opaque ultimate controller information; (3) ﬁrms with missing data; and (4) ﬁrms which are ST or PT that
year. The ﬁnal sample includes 5899 ﬁrm-year observations from 1701 ﬁrms. Among them, there are 3505
ﬁrm-year observations of state-owned enterprises and 2394 ﬁrm-year observations of non-state-owned
enterprises.
We collect data about executive networks and R&D expenditure manually on the basis of relevant
information disclosed in annual reports. Particularly, information about R&D expenditures of the main board
listed companies is obtained from ‘‘development expenditure”, ‘‘G&A (general & administrative) expense” or
‘‘other cash paid relating to operating activities” which are announced in ‘‘Notes to Financial Statements”.
The subject ‘‘development expenditure” contains spending on research and development, and the item
‘‘G&A expense” only discloses period research spending which is an expense. The subject ‘‘other cash paid
relating to operating activities” oﬀers information about R&D expenditure paid by cash. Therefore, in order
to provide an accurate reﬂection of real R&D expenditure, we refer to ‘‘development expenditure” ﬁrst, and
choose the other two subjects if ‘‘development expenditure” is not disclosed. We also get information for ﬁrms
on the SME (small and medium-sized enterprises) board from ‘‘Report of the directorates”. Through the
above data collection process, we ﬁnd 1958 companies with speciﬁc annual R&D data. In regard to other
companies without R&D data, we deﬁne its R&D expenditure as zero. Data for the ultimate controller are
sourced from the CSMAR database, corporate governance and ﬁnancial data are from the CSMAR database
and data about government governance are from the Report on Market Process (Fan et al., 2011). Main
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to eliminate the inﬂuence of extreme values.4 According to the processing of R&D expenditures in the Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises No. 6 – Intangible assets issued
in 2006, ﬁrms should divide R&D process into research stage and development stage. Expensing the expenditures in research stage and
capitalizing the expenditures in development stage if they meet the conditions. Therefore, listed companies adjusted the disclosure of R&D
expenditures in their ﬁnancial statements from 2007, and the sample interval in this paper is 2007–2010.
Table 1
Deﬁnitions of variables.
Variables Name Sign Deﬁnition
Dependent
Variable
R&D Intensity RD (R&D expenditures/total assets) * 100%
Independent
Variables
Government
Governance
GOV Provincial Market Index of Market Process Report (Fan et al., 2011)
Executive networks CS The number of interlocking executives
FNET The number of interlocking companies
Moderating
Variable
Nature of property
rights
STATE 1 for state-owned enterprisesa, otherwise 0
Firm Age AGE Current Year – Registered Year
Financial Leverage LEV Debt Asset Ratio
Growth of enterprise MB Market Value/Total Assets
Proﬁtability ROA Return on assets last year
Counterbalance Degree
of Shareholders
SHRZ The proportion of shares held by the second to ﬁfth largest shareholders/the
proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder
Proportion of
Institutional Ownership
IIS The total proportion of shares held by all the institutional investors
Firm Size SIZE The logarithm of the book value of assets
Governance Structure DCEO 1 for CEO Duality, otherwise 0
Year Dummy YEAR When observed value belongs to year k, it takes a value of 1, otherwise 0
Industry Dummy INDUSTRY When observed value belongs to industry j, it takes a value of 1, otherwise 0
a The corporate nature classiﬁcations in this thesis follow the standard of CSMAR database. The state-owned company includes
state-owned enterprises, state-owned holding enterprises, development zone holding enterprises and institutions holding enterprise. Others
are deﬁned as non-state owned companies.
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Sample companies whose annual R&D expenditure data are unavailable do not necessarily carry out no
R&D activities and investment at all. Therefore, in order to ensure the unbiasedness and consistency of
regression results of such censored observations, we employ a Tobit model5 to test the research questions.
Based on the existing literature (Bhagat and Welch, 1995; Huang and Chen, 2011) and our research
hypotheses, this paper tests variables such as government governance and executive networks and studies their
interaction. Variables and their deﬁnitions are shown in Table 1.
3.2.1. Dependent variables
R&D expenditure directly reﬂects the technological innovation ability of enterprises. Considering the large
diﬀerences in absolute expenditure among listed companies in diﬀerent industries, this paper adopts a
comparative index – R&D intensity, which is the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets (Nam et al.,
2003; Liu and Liu, 2007; Ren, 2010).
3.2.2. Independent variables
3.2.2.1. Government governance. Government governance is based on Market Process Index (Fan et al., 2011).
Since it is only available till 2009, this paper adopts data from 2006 to 2009.5 Tobit model, also known as limited dependent variable model, is mainly used to verify dependent variables with the following
characteristics: variables whose values can be observed are scored higher than 0, while those cannot be observed in the sample are scored 0.
Because data regarding listed company’s R&D expenditure can only be obtained through their annual reports, we score R&D expenditure
of companies without annual disclosure of it as 0. But that does not mean these companies’ actual R&D expenditure is 0, so this paper uses
Tobit model to test the hypotheses. In response to the reviewer’s request of OLS regression testing, we ﬁnd that the results remain
unchanged.
Firm A
1 2 3 4 5
Firm B 
1 5 6 7
Firm C 
2 3 8
Firm D 
1 4 9
Figure 1. Schematic diagram for executive networks.
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technological innovation resources from business networks, including the scale of interlocking executives
(CS) and the number of interlocking listed companies (FNET). Referring to Mintz and Schwartz (1985) and
Stokman et al. (1985), the speciﬁc calculation is the number of executives (including directors, senior
managers and supervisors) who take executive positions directly in other listed companies (including
A-share, B-share and GEM listed companies) and the number of listed companies as a result of management
tenure. As illustrated in Fig. 1, Firm A has ﬁve interlocking executives and three interlocking listed companies.
3.2.3. Moderating variables
Nature of property rights (STATE). Existing research discovered (Li and Xia, 2008; Feng and Wen, 2008)
that the technological innovation ability and R&D intensity of non-state-owned (mainly private-holding)
listed companies are considerably higher than those of state-owned enterprises. The government taking both
the positions of the judge and the player will often interfere with the decisions of state-owned enterprises
because of multiple goals of developing the local economy, employment and social stability. As a result,
state-owned enterprises will abandon some of their R&D activities, which need a large amount of money input
and help raise enterprise value in the long run in order to undertake these social functions for the government.
3.2.4. Control variables
Referring to the existing literature (Bhagat and Welch, 1995; Helfat, 1997; Bah and Dumontier, 2001;
Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Nam et al., 2003; Feng and Wen, 2008; Ren, 2010; Huang and Chen, 2011), this
paper selects the following control variables: (1) Firm age (Age), which refers to the time span from the
establishment of the company to the observation year; (2) Financial leverage (LEV), which reﬂects the
company’s existing capital structure; (3) The growth of enterprises (MB), which is represented by the market
to book value ratio; (4) Proﬁtability (ROA), which reﬂects the enterprise’s resource accumulation ability; (5)
Counterbalance Degree of Shareholders (SHRZ), which represents large shareholders’ constraint of
controlling shareholders; (6) The Proportion of Institutional Ownership (IIS); (7) Firm size (Size); (8)
Corporate governance structure (DCEO), which is evaluated by a dummy variable for CEO duality; (9) Year
dummies (Year), which are used to control for annual diﬀerences in R&D activities; (10) Industry dummies
(Industry), which are used to control for the impact of industries on Enterprise R&D investment. According
to ‘‘Guidelines on the Industry Classiﬁcation of Listed Companies” enacted by the China Securities
Regulatory Commission in 2001, listed companies in China are divided into 13 industries, among which
manufacturing has 10 sub-classes. Therefore the Industry variable is set by the 10 sub-classes under
manufacturing and the other 11 industries, excluding ﬁnance and insurance.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Descriptive statistics
4.1.1. Characteristics of executive networks
Table 2 refers to manually collected statistics of executive networks in all the China A-share listed
companies. According to Table 2, a high proportion of listed companies are involved in executive networks,
Table 2
Annual statistics of executive networks.
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Panel A: Companies involved in executive networks
Involved network companies 1209 1326 1410 1555 1882
Total listed companies 1456 1572 1626 1774 2129
Proportion (%) 83.04 84.35 86.72 87.66 88.40
Panel B: Number of people involved in executive networks
Male 1202 1381 1553 1663 1903
Female 138 162 192 223 267
Total 1340 1543 1745 1886 2170
Panel C: Working characteristics of people involved in executive networks
Hold only one position 1040 1200 1362 1434 1635
Hold two positions 299 340 373 442 529
Hold three positions 1 3 10 10 6
Total 1340 1543 1745 1886 2170
Panel D: Positions of management members holding only one position
Independent directors 643 734 837 919 1080
Director members (excluding independent directors) 320 369 411 402 437
Managers 6 6 7 11 6
Supervisors 71 91 107 102 112
Total 1040 1200 1362 1434 1635
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with low eﬃciency of resource allocation induce companies, especially listed companies to eﬀectively obtain
resources through their own social networks, which has become an eﬀective way of making up for governance
deﬁciencies. In Table 2, management staﬀ involved in executive networks of listed companies also increases
year by year, but there is a relatively small proportion of female staﬀ, with an average number around 11%
each year. In this paper, positions of management staﬀ involved in executive networks are divided into four
categories, i.e. independent directors, board members (except independent directors),6 members of the
Supervisory Board and managers (including president, general manager, department manager and general
director who are disclosed in Annual Reports). Panel C in Table 2 shows that most interlocking managers
in executive networks hold only one position in the network, while Panel D7 illustrates most interlocking
managers taking only one type of position are independent directors.4.1.2. Summary statistics
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of all the variables except year and industry dummy variables. In the
sub-sample (1958 ﬁrm-year observations) with R&D data from annual reports, mean (median) R&D intensity
is 1.41% (0.77%), which indicates that Chinese listed companies’ investment in R&D is generally low. And the
gap between its minimum (0.000058%) and maximum (65.35%) value reﬂects some major diﬀerences among
the ﬁrms. In Table 4, not only the number of companies investing in R&D but also the amounts and intensity
of R&D increase year by year, which implies that companies pay more attention to technological innovation
and view enhancement of core competitiveness as the key strategy. Table 5 by industry illustrates that
companies with higher R&D expenditures are mostly concentrated in the manufacturing and IT industries,
which means industrial characteristics is an important determinant of corporate R&D investment. There6 If board members serve as managers simultaneously within the same company, they are regarded as board members in statistics.
7 Part D in Table 2 categorizes all of the positions interlocking managers hold in diﬀerent listed companies according to four
management positions.
Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
Variables N Mean Std. dev. Lower quartile Median Upper quartile Min Max
RD 5899 0.470 1.290 0 0 0.120 0 10
MKT 5899 8.820 2.010 7.260 8.930 10.550 0.380 11.800
CS 5899 2.500 1.960 1 2 3 0 19
FNET 5899 3.830 3.100 1 3 5 0 22
STATE 5899 0.590 0.490 0 1 1 0 1
AGE 5899 11.87 4.600 9 12 15 0 28
LEV 5899 0.480 0.200 0.340 0.490 0.630 0.0600 0.920
MB 5899 4.880 3.580 2.530 4 5.980 0.620 21.620
ROA 5899 0.050 0.050 0.020 0.040 0.070 0.150 0.220
SHRZ 5899 0.560 0.540 0.140 0.380 0.830 0.020 2.470
IIS 5899 0.240 0.220 0.040 0.170 0.400 0 0.800
SIZE 5899 21.70 1.21 20.84 21.55 22.39 19.25 25.43
DCEO 5899 0.160 0.370 0 0 0 0 1
Table 4
R&D investment: annual statistics.
2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
N 280 299 591 788 1958
Mean of R&D Expenditure (ten-thousand-yuan) 3320 3740 4340 5390 4530
N 280 299 545 626 1750
Mean of R&D Intensity (%) 1.0138 0.9060 1.8951 2.1918 1.6912
Table 5
R&D intensity: statistics by industry.
Na nb Mean Min (%) Max (%)
INDA 125 32 0.4415 0.0018 1.9167
INDB 149 29 0.8716 0.0007 2.5814
INDC 3420 1560 1.3333 0.00006 65.3549
INDD 245 29 0.104 0.0021 1.5055
INDE 138 27 0.7963 0.0005 3.3392
INDF 258 8 0.1542 0.0082 0.3807
INDG 371 176 2.6709 0.0161 31.0237
INDH 358 27 0.5496 0.0031 3.0742
INDJ 332 12 0.0534 0.0047 0.2677
INDK 190 15 1.5237 0.007 4.4692
INDL 41 3 29.9983 0.0225 46.0365
INDM 272 40 0.3669 0.007 1.3709
Total 5899 1958 1.4087 0.0018 1.9167
a N denotes the number of observations in full sample (5899) by industry.
b ‘‘n” denotes the number of observations in sub-sample (1958) by industry.
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of executive networks in listed companies (distribution structure of executive networks is shown in Table 6).
Table 7 presents correlation analysis between the major variables. There is a signiﬁcant positive correlation
between R&D intensity (RD) and executive networks (CS, FNET), which means establishment of this
network will encourage enterprises to increase investment in R&D. Also, there is a signiﬁcant positive
correlation between R&D intensity (RD) and the eﬃciency of government governance (MKT), which means
that government institutional arrangements and the eﬀectiveness of governance have an important impact on
R&D decision-making and create a favorable external institutional environment for enterprises’ R&D
Table 6
Structure of executive networks.
CS N Proportion (%) CS N Proportion (%)
Panel A: Distribution of interlocking managers
0 693 11.75 9 18 0.31
1 1358 23.02 10 18 0.31
2 1414 23.97 11 11 0.19
3 975 16.53 12 3 0.05
4 604 10.24 13 1 0.02
5 387 6.56 14 1 0.02
6 221 3.75 15 1 0.02
7 125 2.12 19 1 0.02
8 68 1.15
FNET N Proportion FNET N Proportion
Panel B: Distribution of interlocking companies
0 693 11.75 11 65 1.10
1 823 13.95 12 45 0.76
2 855 14.49 13 30 0.51
3 726 12.31 14 29 0.49
4 739 12.53 15 12 0.20
5 599 10.15 16 9 0.15
6 437 7.41 17 5 0.08
7 313 5.31 18 5 0.08
8 230 3.90 19 1 0.02
9 166 2.81 20 3 0.05
10 113 1.92 22 1 0.02
Table 7
Correlation coeﬃcients between the main variables.
RD MKT CS FNET STATE
RD 1 0.0294** 0.0293** 0.0120 0.0486***
MKT 0.0993*** 1 0.1110*** 0.1391*** 0.1474***
CS 0.0097 0.1009*** 1 0.8383*** 0.2432***
FNET 0.0410*** 0.1321*** 0.7904*** 1 0.1796***
STATE 0.1241*** 0.1668*** 0.2201*** 0.1648*** 1
The lower left part is Pearson correlation coeﬃcients, the upper right part is Spearman correlation coeﬃcients.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
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negatively correlated means that the R&D intensity of non-state-owned enterprises is higher than that of
state-owned enterprises, and compared with state-owned enterprises, and non-state-owned enterprises without
protective policy advantages are more motivated to enhance their own core competitiveness through increased
research and development investment.4.2. Empirical results
4.2.1. Tests of governance and executive networks on R&D
Table 8 shows regression results between R&D intensity and size of executive networks and governance
eﬃciency respectively.8 In Column 1, governance eﬃciency has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on R&D intensity8 Innovation expenditures disclosed in items ‘‘development expenditure”, ‘‘management expense” and ‘‘other cash paid relating to
operating activities” in ‘‘Notes to Financial Statements” have diﬀerent emphases and refer to diﬀerent R&D expenses. We test with all
these three types of data and ﬁnd the results remain unchanged.
Table 8
Regression results.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GOV 0.097*** 0.0881** 0.093***
(0.023) (0.037) (0.035)
CS 0.081*** 0.059
(0.024) (0.105)
FNET 0.052*** 0.054
(0.014) (0.067)
GOV * CS 0.002
(0.012)
GOV * FNET 0.001
(0.007)
AGE 0.067*** 0.072*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
LEV 0.397 0.393 0.381 0.430 0.418
(0.289) (0.290) (0.289) (0.289) (0.289)
MB 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.046***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
ROA 5.173*** 5.371*** 5.338*** 5.173*** 5.146***
(0.936) (0.935) (0.934) (0.934) (0.934)
SHRZ 0.059 0.069 0.068 0.063 0.061
(0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081)
IIS 0.343 0.256 0.289 0.276 0.306
(0.249) (0.251) (0.250) (0.250) (0.249)
SIZE 0.084* 0.117** 0.113** 0.121** 0.116**
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
DCEO 0.185 0.271** 0.270** 0.213* 0.212*
(0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.115) (0.114)
Constant 0.953 0.549 0.445 0.254 0.417
(1.035) (1.033) (1.026) (1.091) (1.070)
YEAR Controlled
INDUSTRY Controlled
N 5899 5899 5899 5899 5899
Chi2 1491*** 1485*** 1486*** 1501*** 1501***
Pseudo-R2 0.118 0.117 0.117 0.118 0.118
Standard errors are in brackets.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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activities. The relatively weak innovation capacity during China’s economic transition and the support of
government policy pose constraints to enterprises’ self-innovation. In order to encourage their self-
innovation enthusiasm and promote regional economic growth, local governments provide preferential tax
and subsidy policies. Regions with more eﬃcient governance generally possess more resources and more
eﬀective policy formulation and execution to support enterprises’ R&D. Therefore, their economic strength
and core competitiveness are eﬀectively enhanced. In Column 2, R&D intensity has a signiﬁcant positive
relationship with executive networks at the level of 1%, i.e. the larger the listed companies’ executive networks
are, the stronger its R&D intensity. This demonstrates that social networks via executives’ external positions
do provide more abundant resources, which helps the company reduce transaction costs, optimize resource
allocation and enhance core competitiveness. As China is currently experiencing economic transition and
has not yet formed a relatively perfect market and institutional environment, the overall social technological
innovation ability still lags behind developed countries and R&D capacity remains the bottleneck for the
sustainable development of enterprises. Therefore, active and independent innovation and eﬀective access
to technological resources are still essential for enterprises to pursue long-term value, growth and
sustainability. This executive network opens up new opportunities to listed companies, not only arousing their
Table 9
Regression results based on the nature of property rights.
Variables (1) (2) (3)
GOV 0.165***
(0.036)
CS 0.126***
(0.040)
FNET 0.0952***
(0.023)
STATE 1.154*** 0.334** 0.431***
(0.435) (0.152) (0.146)
GOV * STATE 0.097**
(0.047)
CS * STATE 0.075
(0.048)
FNET * STATE 0.072**
(0.029)
AGE 0.069*** 0.075*** 0.073***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
LEV 0.339 0.365 0.340
(0.290) (0.290) (0.290)
MB 0.049*** 0.047*** 0.045***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
ROA 5.406*** 5.567*** 5.530***
(0.945) (0.943) (0.941)
SHRZ 0.094 0.10 0.099
(0.083) (0.083) (0.082)
IIS 0.290 0.225 0.256
(0.250) (0.251) (0.250)
SIZE 0.106** 0.125** 0.120**
(0.048) (0.049) (0.048)
DCEO 0.217* 0.302*** 0.304***
(0.116) (0.115) (0.115)
Constant 1.208 0.605 0.417
(1.084) (1.045) (1.040)
YEAR Controlled
INDUSTRY Controlled
N 5899 5899 5899
Chi2 1503*** 1489*** 1495***
Pseudo-R2 0.119 0.117 0.118
Standard errors are in brackets.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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lacking technological innovation ability to enhance their core value. Columns 4 and 5 show that there are
no signiﬁcant relationships between the interaction of these two inﬂuencing factors and R&D intensity.
Therefore, informal and formal institutional arrangements aﬀect R&D activities with their own unique
mechanism, which means the two mechanisms are parallel.
All regression results show that enterprise Age and R&D intensity have a signiﬁcant negative correlation at
the level of 1%, namely the younger the enterprise is, the stronger the R&D intensity will be, which is consistent
with Ahuja and Lampert (2001). Older enterprises tend to rely on their existing growth opportunities and rest
on their laurels; thus, they fall into the trap of innovation restriction and gradually lose their adaptability to
their unpredictable competitive environment. MB and R&D intensity have signiﬁcant positive correlations
at the level of 1%, implying that high-growth companies are more motivated in R&D investment to advance
their core values and promote fast development. ROA and R&D intensity have a signiﬁcant positive correlation
Table 10
Two-stage regressions using instrumental variables.
Variables (1) (2)
CS 0.0674**
(0.0306)
FNET 0.0560***
(0.0198)
AGE 0.144*** 0.142***
(0.0113) (0.0113)
LEV 0.454 0.452
(0.312) (0.311)
MB 0.0560*** 0.0547***
(0.0164) (0.0164)
ROA 5.440*** 5.398***
(0.969) (0.968)
SHRZ 0.194** 0.193**
(0.0879) (0.0878)
IIS 0.0762 0.0997
(0.274) (0.272)
SIZE 0.150*** 0.157***
(0.0525) (0.0522)
DCEO 0.491*** 0.497***
(0.122) (0.121)
Constant 3.175*** 3.231***
(1.116) (1.107)
YEAR Controlled
INDUSTRY Controlled
Na 4198 4198
Chi2 1217*** 1221***
chi2_exog 0.141 0.924
p_exog 0.707 0.336
Standard errors are in brackets.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
a Data on dependent variables in the second stage regression model are from 2008 to 2010 only, data of
year 2007 are not included, and thus the sample size is reduced.
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SHRZ and R&D intensity have a signiﬁcant positive correlation. Companies with CEO duality have higher
R&D intensity, which implies that the CEO taking the position as chairman will exercise more inﬂuence and
control over the enterprise, gain more resources and autonomy for innovation, which prompts him to exert
his talent and entrepreneurship. Meanwhile, it facilitates the communication between management and
shareholders to better formulate and implement its R&D strategy. This conclusion also provides new empirical
evidence to ‘‘modern stewardship theory”.4.2.2. Regressions based on ownership classification
Based on the results in Table 8, this paper tests the interaction eﬀects of government governance, executive
networks and property rights respectively, which are shown in Table 9. In column 1, the interaction coeﬃcient
of government governance and property rights is signiﬁcantly negative at the level of 5%, indicating that
compared to state-owned enterprises, governance eﬃciency exerts greater impact on R&D investment in
non-state-owned enterprises. As allocation of government resources between SOEs and non-SOEs is
sequential, improvement of governance eﬃciency can eﬀectively protect fairness, and its impact on corporate
R&D investment in the non-state-owned enterprises is more obvious. Column 3 shows the interaction
coeﬃcient of executive networks and property rights is signiﬁcantly negative at the level of 5%, i.e. compared
Table 11
Alternative government governance variables.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CS 0.0992 0.0281
(0.179) (0.0580)
FNET 0.0862 0.0258
(0.111) (0.0364)
GOV1 0.187*** 0.141** 0.132**
(0.0364) (0.0559) (0.0535)
GOV1c 0.0500*** 0.0317 0.0356
(0.0146) (0.0225) (0.0217)
CS * GOV1 0.0194
(0.0195)
CS * GOV1c 0.00673
(0.00725)
FNET * GOV1 0.0148
(0.0121)
FNET * GOV1c 0.00317
(0.00453)
AGE 0.0697*** 0.0725*** 0.0706*** 0.0696*** 0.0724*** 0.0703***
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0103)
LEV 0.397 0.429 0.417 0.380 0.418 0.404
(0.289) (0.289) (0.288) (0.289) (0.289) (0.289)
MB 0.0488*** 0.0489*** 0.0478*** 0.0472*** 0.0471*** 0.0461***
(0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145)
ROA 5.121*** 5.127*** 5.076*** 5.236*** 5.252*** 5.202***
(0.936) (0.934) (0.933) (0.936) (0.934) (0.933)
SHRZ 0.0633 0.0669 0.0648 0.0631 0.0667 0.0647
(0.0810) (0.0808) (0.0807) (0.0810) (0.0809) (0.0808)
IIS 0.310 0.251 0.282 0.330 0.271 0.297
(0.249) (0.250) (0.249) (0.250) (0.250) (0.249)
SIZE 0.0763 0.115** 0.110** 0.0780* 0.117** 0.112**
(0.0466) (0.0479) (0.0475) (0.0466) (0.0480) (0.0476)
DCEO 0.187 0.217* 0.214* 0.204* 0.236** 0.233**
(0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114)
Constant 1.881* 0.811 0.863 0.502 0.288 0.131
(1.074) (1.162) (1.141) (1.022) (1.049) (1.038)
YEAR Controlled
INDUSTRY Controlled
N 5899 5899 5899 5899 5899 5899
Chi2 1501 1512 1513 1485 1496 1497
Pseudo-R2 0.118 0.119 0.119 0.117 0.118 0.118
Standard errors are in brackets.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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enhancing R&D investment, which suggests that non-state-owned enterprises with relatively scarcer resources
will actively use informal institutional arrangements to ease pressure on resource constraints when resources
cannot be eﬀectively obtained through formal institutional arrangements.
4.3. Robustness tests
5.5.1. Endogenous executive networks
Companies’ R&D expenditure is aﬀected by information diﬀusion, and the role of information is usually
hard to observe and quantify, so we deal with it as a noise. Moreover, enterprises with stronger technological
innovation abilities and better external images are deemed to have more qualiﬁed management members, who
Table 12
Indirect eﬀect of monopoly and bankruptcy risk.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
CS 0.128*** 0.0827***
(0.0246) (0.0245)
FNET 0.0630*** 0.0530***
(0.0150) (0.0150)
Monopoly 1.745*** 1.604***
(0.358) (0.351)
CS * Monopoly 0.0924
(0.0947)
FNET * Monopoly 0.0938
(0.0641)
Bankruptcy 0.441* 0.508**
(0.246) (0.240)
CS * Bankruptcy 0.0237
(0.0772)
FNET * Bankruptcy 0.0004
(0.0472)
AGE 0.107*** 0.103*** 0.0678*** 0.0656***
(0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0104) (0.0104)
LEV 0.228 0.264 0.559* 0.550*
(0.287) (0.287) (0.298) (0.298)
MB 0.0477*** 0.0463*** 0.0580*** 0.0570***
(0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0151) (0.0151)
ROA 4.645*** 4.605*** 4.439*** 4.383***
(0.970) (0.970) (1.049) (1.048)
SHRZ 0.126 0.123 0.0776 0.0764
(0.0838) (0.0838) (0.0814) (0.0813)
IIS 0.407 0.487* 0.223 0.253
(0.257) (0.257) (0.251) (0.251)
SIZE 0.231*** 0.214*** 0.132*** 0.130***
(0.0480) (0.0478) (0.0489) (0.0486)
DCEO 0.452*** 0.444*** 0.265** 0.265**
(0.118) (0.118) (0.114) (0.114)
Constant 4.685*** 4.338*** 0.813 0.732
(1.012) (1.007) (1.046) (1.038)
YEAR Controlled
INDUSTRY Controlled
N 5899 5899 5866 5866
Chi2 721.8 712.7 1491 1493
Pseudo-R2 0.0569 0.0562 0.118 0.118
Standard errors are in brackets.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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these reasons, there is inevitably an endogenous relationship between the random disturbance variables and
the executive network variables. Therefore, in order to eliminate the impact of endogeneity, this paper selects
the lagged data of executive networks (CSt1, FNETt1), companies cross-listed as B-shares or H-shares
(CROSSLIST, cross-listed is valued 1, 0 otherwise) and the scale of executives in listed companies (NM) as
instrumental variables, and uses Tobit models to conduct two-stage regressions. The regression results are
consistent with the above ones, and the indicator detecting endogeneity chi2_exog9 does not reject the null
hypothesis. Namely, the instrumental variables eﬀectively eliminate endogeneity (Table 10).9 In STATA software, the null hypothesis of indicator ‘‘chi2_exog” is: instrumental variables are exogenous, ‘‘p_exog” refers to ‘‘p-
value” of this indicator.
Table 13
Regression results after excluding monopoly companies.
Variables (1) (2)
CS 0.183***
(0.0416)
FNET 0.117***
(0.0246)
STATE 0.362** 0.513***
(0.158) (0.152)
CS * STATE 0.0939*
(0.0502)
FNET * STATE 0.0934***
(0.0302)
AGE 0.115*** 0.111***
(0.0104) (0.0103)
LEV 0.0770 0.131
(0.291) (0.290)
MB 0.0534*** 0.0522***
(0.0150) (0.0150)
ROA 4.906*** 4.884***
(0.991) (0.991)
SHRZ 0.160* 0.163*
(0.0873) (0.0871)
IIS 0.316 0.387
(0.262) (0.261)
SIZE 0.316*** 0.297***
(0.0494) (0.0492)
DCEO 0.501*** 0.495***
(0.121) (0.121)
Constant 1.944*** 1.912***
(0.160) (0.160)
YEAR Controlled
INDUSTRY Controlled
N 5728 5728
Chi2 1489*** 1495***
Pseudo-R2 0.117 0.118
Standard errors are in brackets.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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Given a large quantity of indicators of local governance level and eﬃciency, this paper attempts to
introduce two sub-indexes ‘‘1 relationship between government and the market” and ‘‘1c reducing government
intervention in companies” as proxy variables for the levels of governance (see Table 11). The basic
conclusions are not aﬀected.
State-owned enterprises have a relatively small bankruptcy risk and can survive without innovation;
therefore, they lack the motivation for technological innovation. Among them, consensus on correlation
between monopolized industries and technological innovation has not been reached yet and is to be tested.
Therefore, Tables 12 and 13 test the relationship from perspectives of the nature of corporate monopoly
and bankruptcy risk. Referring to Qiu et al.’s (2010) deﬁnition, we add a dummy variable ‘‘monopoly or
not (Monopoly)” to the regression model and take into consideration the impact of CS * Monopoly
(FNET * Monopoly). Regarding bankruptcy risk, although this article has excluded observations labeled with
ST or PT that year, to be safe, we refer to Altman’s (1968) deﬁnition on ‘‘bankruptcy Z value” and add a
dummy variable ‘‘bankruptcy or not (Bankruptcy)” to the regression model and take into consideration
the interaction eﬀect (CS * Bankruptcy, FNET * Bankruptcy). The results show that there is no signiﬁcant
Table 14
Test of control variables in high-tech innovative companies.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CS 0.0852*** 0.0202
(0.0230) (0.103)
FNET 0.0489*** 0.0380
(0.0140) (0.0652)
GOV 0.0677*** 0.0461 0.0583*
(0.0226) (0.0360) (0.0347)
CS * GOV 0.00685
(0.0112)
FNET * GOV 0.000838
(0.00695)
Innovative 1.300*** 1.288*** 1.265*** 1.273*** 1.261***
(0.0991) (0.0990) (0.0995) (0.0994) (0.0993)
AGE 0.0593*** 0.0573*** 0.0553*** 0.0581*** 0.0559***
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102)
LEV 0.225 0.212 0.218 0.253 0.239
(0.284) (0.284) (0.284) (0.284) (0.284)
MB 0.0470*** 0.0459*** 0.0481*** 0.0480*** 0.0470***
(0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0142)
ROA 4.466*** 4.447*** 4.350*** 4.356*** 4.333***
(0.918) (0.917) (0.920) (0.917) (0.917)
SHRZ 0.0267 0.0257 0.0199 0.0241 0.0222
(0.0793) (0.0793) (0.0794) (0.0793) (0.0792)
IIS 0.139 0.179 0.227 0.157 0.193
(0.245) (0.244) (0.244) (0.245) (0.244)
SIZE 0.0663 0.0592 0.0309 0.0709 0.0622
(0.0472) (0.0469) (0.0459) (0.0472) (0.0469)
DCEO 0.196* 0.194* 0.129 0.161 0.156
(0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112)
Constant 0.812 0.972 2.057** 1.190 1.486
(1.017) (1.011) (1.019) (1.072) (1.053)
YEAR Controlled
INDUSTRY Controlled
N 5899 5899 5899 5899 5899
Chi2 1657 1655 1652 1665 1662
Pseudo-R2 0.131 0.130 0.130 0.131 0.131
Standard errors are in brackets.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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monopoly industries and bankruptcy risk have no eﬀect on the network. Thus, the basic conclusions remain
unaﬀected.
Moreover, considering the relatively high R&D expenditure of high-tech innovation enterprises, Table 14
identiﬁes ‘‘high-tech innovation enterprises” according to RESSET database’s deﬁnition standards10 and then
introduces a dummy variable ‘‘Innovative” in the regression as a control variable (high-tech innovation
enterprises are valued 1, 0 otherwise). The conclusions remain consistent.
Regions with high eﬃciency are often economically developed and local governments tend to provide more
ﬁnancial support for technological innovation of enterprises. Therefore, in order to testify that the positive10 In RESSET database, enterprises are divided into seven categories: 1. High-tech enterprises; 2. Tech enterprises; 3. Torch Plan; 4. 863
plan; 5. Agricultural industrialized key state enterprises; 6. Innovative enterprise; 7. Key software enterprises within state planning. This
paper identiﬁes all these types as high-tech innovative enterprises except category 5.
Table 15
Instrumental variables of government’s science and technology expenditure.
Variables (1) (2) (3)
GOV 0.0173*** 0.0179*** 0.0265***
(0.0066) (0.0062) (0.0062)
CS 0.118***
(0.0394)
FNET 0.0818***
(0.0249)
CS * GOV 0.00232
(0.0017)
FNET * GOV 0.00165*
(0.0010)
STATE 0.690***
(0.166)
GOV * STATE 0.0236***
(0.0070)
AGE 0.0693*** 0.0673*** 0.0663***
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0106)
LEV 0.458 0.450 0.384
(0.290) (0.290) (0.290)
MB 0.0458*** 0.0443*** 0.0477***
(0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145)
ROA 5.235*** 5.237*** 5.457***
(0.934) (0.933) (0.944)
SHRZ 0.0651 0.0640 0.0921
(0.0809) (0.0809) (0.0826)
IIS 0.282 0.314 0.328
(0.250) (0.250) (0.250)
SIZE 0.120** 0.120** 0.104**
(0.0480) (0.0476) (0.0476)
DCEO 0.216* 0.217* 0.213*
(0.115) (0.115) (0.116)
Constant 0.130 0.0882 0.351
(1.046) (1.031) (1.037)
YEAR Controlled
INDUSTRY Controlled
N 5899 5899 5899
Chi2 1148*** 1150*** 1148***
chi2_exog 2.435 2.659 3.675
p_exog 0.119 0.103 0.0552
Standard errors are in brackets.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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than ﬁnancial support, we introduce annual S&T ﬁnancial expenditure data of provincial governments from
the Zhonghong Database (FISCAL) as an instrumental variable of government governance. The test results
remain robust (see Table 15).
4.3.3. Alternative regression methods
In order to avoid sample selection bias, we use a Tobit model in our empirical testing and regard corporate
R&D expenditure as zero when there is no relevant data disclosure. However, the number of observations
available accounts for about 1/3 of the total sample number, so when doing the robustness test, we consider
applying OLS regression models to test this sub-sample. The test results are shown in Table 16. Size of exec-
utive networks and R&D intensity are signiﬁcantly positively correlated at the level of 1%, which is consistent
Table 16
OLS regression results.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GOV 0.00599** 0.00593 0.00695*
(0.0026) (0.0042) (0.0039)
CS 0.0377* 0.0485
(0.0204) (0.0301)
FNET 0.0382*** 0.0447**
(0.0127) (0.0194)
GOV * CS 0.000609
(0.0012)
GOV * FNET 0.000499
(0.0007)
AGE 0.0804*** 0.0826*** 0.0813*** 0.0937*** 0.0916***
(0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0093) (0.0091) (0.0089)
LEV 0.308 0.313 0.308 0.477* 0.483*
(0.277) (0.277) (0.277) (0.271) (0.270)
MB 0.0459*** 0.0461*** 0.0454*** 0.0426*** 0.0413***
(0.0142) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0145) (0.0145)
ROA 6.971*** 7.040*** 7.050*** 6.137*** 6.133***
(0.868) (0.870) (0.869) (0.863) (0.860)
SHRZ 0.277*** 0.280*** 0.278*** 0.271*** 0.267***
(0.0773) (0.0774) (0.0774) (0.0786) (0.0786)
IIS 0.124 0.0589 0.0673 0.0519 0.0769
(0.229) (0.229) (0.229) (0.235) (0.235)
SIZE 0.220*** 0.237*** 0.248*** 0.263*** 0.268***
(0.0458) (0.0463) (0.0462) (0.0455) (0.0451)
DCEO 0.333*** 0.374*** 0.382*** 0.472*** 0.477***
(0.122) (0.121) (0.120) (0.126) (0.125)
Constant 6.176*** 6.685*** 6.850*** 7.782*** 7.815***
(0.977) (0.977) (0.974) (0.977) (0.957)
YEAR Controlled
INDUSTRY Controlled
N 1750 1750 1750 1750 1750
F value 23.45 22.77 23.05 33.98 34.67
Adjusted-R2 0.299 0.298 0.300 0.243 0.245
Standard errors are in brackets.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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the level of 5%. Thus, the conclusions still support the above hypotheses.5. Conclusion
In the competitive context of accelerated integration of the global economy, enterprises increasingly rely on
innovation ability to survive and develop. R&D as a crucial form of ﬁrm innovation is critical in continuously
improving and maintaining the enterprises’ and even the country’s competitive advantage. However, R&D
activity is full of uncertainty and risk. On the one hand, the huge R&D investment and the high uncertainty
of the market and technology are formidable. On the other hand, enterprises have to invest in R&D to gain
market opportunities and high proﬁts under the pressure of competition. Therefore, it is necessary to acquire
resources to provide funds for corporate R&D activities and eﬀectively reduce the risk. Based on the
institutional arrangements perspective, this paper uses listed companies’ data from 2007 to 2010 and ﬁnds that
both informal and formal institutional arrangements can supply resources to corporate R&D activities,
thereby verifying that executive network size and the eﬃciency of government governance are vital factors
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imperfect formal system. They can improve the ineﬀectiveness of an imperfect formal system. The diﬀerence
is that companies get more technical information through executive networks, but more policy and funding
support from government.
Meanwhile, further research also shows that, compared to non-state-owned enterprises, government
governance and executive networks have a weaker eﬀect on the R&D expenditures of state-owned enterprises.
Compared to non-board-listed companies, government governance (executive networks) has a stronger
(weaker) eﬀect on the R&D expenditures of board-listed enterprises. The ﬁndings show that long-standing
monopoly and scale advantages have formed state-owned enterprises’ technical dominance to a certain extent;
thus, they place less emphasis on the external environment and external networks than private enterprises.
Similarly, due to its size, industry characteristics and other factors, enterprises in small and medium sectors
are subject to stricter management by regulatory agencies, and therefore their motivation for building an
executive network is more intense.
The limitations of this paper lie in the data and market process index. The workload of data collection and
selection is enormous, and updating of the data is still continuing. In 2012, our country embarked on a
comprehensive and deepening national reform, which may have an impact on our original data. But given
the timing eﬀect, our results suﬀered limited impact. Of course, inﬂuenced by reform, changes and impacts
of future government governance and executive networks should be more interesting topics. Meanwhile, there
lies a certain degree of error in employing the overall market process index as a proxy for local governance
eﬃciency. So we chose many more alternative indicators to substitute for this proxy, but pinning down a
relatively precise indicator of local government governance remains a key issue.
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